Th is paper examines the profi les and work tasks of offi cials in central and regional administration in the Czech Republic. It analyzes data from surveys among the offi cials of eleven ministries in 2013 (N = 1351) and fourteen regional offi ces in 2012 (N = 783). First, the profi le of ministerial offi cials (MOs) is compared with that of regional-level offi cials (ROs). In accordance with our hypotheses, on average it is found that MOs are, when compared to ROs, older, more educated and have spent more time in civil service. Th ere is also a higher proportion of men in ministries than in regional offi ces. On the other hand, ministerial work seems to be aff ected by higher levels of fl uctuation than jobs in the regional offi ces. Second, we compare work tasks of MOs and ROs. As expected, MOs are more involved in analytical tasks and research than ROs. In contrast, ROs are more likely to implement policies or programs, direct and monitor programs or lower-level bodies, provide advice for political bodies of the region, negotiate with elected politicians, communicate with citizens and provide methodological guidance, train or lecture. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, we found a strong positive correlation between analytical and brokering tasks (communication and negotiation). We thus reject the hypothesis that analytical tasks are at odds with negotiating and communication. Instead, it is concluded that most offi cials are multitaskers, and it is especially so in regional offi ces. It is hypothesized that this might be caused by the fact that regional offi ces are smaller and have a lower capacity to specialize.
Introduction
Ministries are somewhat enigmatic institutions for many people. Ministerial offi cials are usually guarded from ordinary citizens by reception clerks who reject all unauthorized visitors. Information on what concrete tasks are undertaken in a given ministry and which members of staff are responsible for them are oft en restricted. Th e same is true, though to a lesser degree, for sub-national government offi ces. Even for public-administration researchers it is usually not easy to be allowed to study internal ministerial processes and work that is actually being done there. It seems to be especially so in an administrative environment with a low level of trust, which is one of the signifi cant features of public administration in CEE (Randma-Liiv 2008; Bouckaert et al. 2011; Veselý 2013a ).
Surveys of public offi cials have, of course, for a long time been a well-established part of public-administration research (Lee et al. 2012) . Until recently, however, the survey research focused upon topics such as public-service motivation, attitudes, beliefs etc., and surprisingly little attention was paid to the actual work that public offi cials do as well as their work profi le. Th is started to change during the mid-2000s with qualitative case studies in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Page and Jenkins 2005; Colebatch 2006) . At the same time, theories on so-called "policy work" in public administration has started to be formulated (Colebatch and Radin 2006; Colebatch et al. 2010 ; see also Kohoutek et al. 2013 for review) . A bit later, a series of large-scale quantitative studies of Canadian federal and provincial policy bureaucrats were undertaken (e.g. Wellstead, Stedman and Lindquist 2009; Wellstead and Stedman 2010; Howlett and Newman 2010; Howlett and Wellstead 2012; Howlett and Walker 2012) . Together with national surveys on public-administration offi cials in countries such as Norway or the Netherlands (e.g. 't Hart et al. 2007) , we now have a solid base of empirical evidence from several of the most developed countries.
However, evidence from CEE countries is still very much limited, and just a few large-scale empirical surveys have been conducted in the region. Th e exception to this include a web-based survey of civil servants in the ministerial bureaucracies developed and managed by OECD in co-operation with RAND Europe (MeyerSahling 2009 ) and an executive survey on public-sector reform in Europe under the project "Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future" (COCOPS), which was realized in Hungary, Lithuania, Serbia and Croatia. In other countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there have also been several narrower and more specialized studies (Drulák et al. 2003; Scherpereel 2004) . 3 Even these exceptions, however, provide very little information on what people in public administration actually do and what their basic characteristics are. Th e aim of this paper is to fi ll this gap in knowledge by presenting hitherto unpublished data from two large-N empirical surveys that were recently carried out in the Czech Republic. Th e fi rst objective of this article is to describe the main characteristics of ministerial offi cials (hereinaft er "MOs") and compare them with the main characteristics of regional-level offi cials (hereinaft er "ROs") on the basis of several theory-led hypotheses. Th e second objective is to analyze the main types of tasks MOs and ROs undertake and to refl ect this evidence in light of existing theories about the nature of works in central and regional government administration. Th e two surveys were carried out within a one-year period, were based upon the same theoretical framework and shared identical questions. We thus not only can for the fi rst time describe in depth the profi le and work of public offi cials in one of the CEE countries, but also -and this can be of interest to scholars outside CEE -diff erences between two levels of government -central and regional.
Theoretical background, hypotheses and research questions
In this paper, we deal with two interrelated topics: 1) comparison of the profi les of ministerial and regional offi cials; 2) types of tasks and activities undertaken by ministerial and regional offi cials. We will fi rst examine research questions, assumptions and the theoretical background of the fi rst topic.
Regarding the profi les of MOs and ROs, we are particularly interested in the following questions: What kind of people work in these key offi ces ? What kind of environments are they recruited from ? How long have they been working in the offi ce and how long are they planning to stay ? Existing theory provides us with few answers to these profi le questions. However, based on similar surveys abroad (especially in Canada) and practical experience with the situation of public administration in the Czech Republic, we can formulate a limited number of assumptions about the typical characteristics of MOs and ROs, as well as possible diff erences between them. First, international evidence (Howlett and Newman 2010) suggests that male offi cials are in the majority in central administration (ministerial offi cials) and female offi cials in regional administration. 4 Second, MOs can be expected to be older than ROs, primarily because the regional offi ces are historically much younger institutions than ministries. When the regional offi ces were initially established in 2000, they probably recruited a considerable part of their staff from the abol-ished system of district offi ces, but at the same time, they hired many candidates, including young people, from outside the public sector. Th is is related to another hypothesis, namely that ROs have, on average, shorter career histories in public administration than MOs.
Th ird, we can expect somewhat higher education levels among MOs, especially since education levels in Prague (where all the ministries are located) are generally higher than in the regions. Another reason is that ministries might have higher concentrations of jobs in analytical departments and units that require a rich educational background or even a scientifi c qualifi cation. On a similar note, we expect diff erences in the composition of previous job experience. If government ministries are indeed responsible for more analytically demanding tasks, then they should be staff ed by more people with experience from academia (universities, the Academy of Sciences etc.). In contrast, ROs should typically have their previous job experience from other bodies of public administration (such as the district offi ces).
Th e last profi le question concerns the offi cials' career plans, and specifi cally their intention to stay with the present bureau. In this respect, it should be noted that Act No. 218 / 2002 Coll. (the so-called Civil Service Act) was still ineff ective at the time of our data collection, while Act No. 312 / 2002 Coll. (on Civil Servants in Regional Government) was fully implemented. For that reason, civil servants in the entire central government administration were working under more precarious conditions than those employed at the regional level. Th erefore, we expect MOs to have shorter career plans than ROs. Th is is further supported by the fact that employment opportunities in Prague are much better than in the regions. Consequently, MOs might be tempted to leave the ministerial job.
Th e second group of research questions relates to the actual work done by MOs and ROs. What kind of tasks do they undertake and how oft en ? In what aspects of work do they diff er from one another ? Th e work of government ministries goes far beyond the "mere" draft ing of regulations and the administration of diverse forms. As bodies of central government, ministries have extensive and highly heterogeneous responsibilities and powers. In the Czech Republic, the scope of their offi cial authority is defi ned by Act No. 2 / 1969 Coll. (the so-called Competence Act). While the text of the law is relatively brief and abstract, it does prescribe a highly diverse array of responsibilities for the diff erent ministries. Th ey are obliged to coordinate individual bodies of public administration, prepare conceptual and strategic documents for their policy domains, prepare and table draft laws, provide information and methodological guidance, negotiate agreements, direct government inspection in specifi c areas, etc. Th e thirteen Czech regions (kraje) are autonomously governed and were only established in 2001 as a result of extensive decentralization (Baun and Marek 2006) . Th eir administration is concentrated in regional offi ces. In contrast to ministries, which usually have a long history, Czech regions are thus rather new institutions. However, they also have a wide range of competencies and responsibilities, especially in social and health services, education, infrastructure development, environment protection etc. Offi cials at both central and regional government administration can also be expected to undertake a vast array of tasks.
Indeed, empirical evidence from other countries suggests that government and regional offi cials are no longer (if they ever were) just bureaucrats stamping and circulating documents. In fact, they "have numerous tasks including formal analysis, writing reports, managing the demands of the governmental process and above all, interacting with other players involved in the issue" (Colebatch et al. 2010, 15) . Th e work of offi cials both at the central and regional levels include draft ing legislation, writing policy papers, implementing various programs and projects, monitoring the work of lower-level bodies, formulating offi cial positions on various issues etc. Th is is an immensely heterogeneous mix of tasks (Radin 2013) .
In this paper, we are primarily interested in two categories of tasks which have thus far enjoyed the most theoretical and empirical attention. Th e fi rst category concerns policy analysis (Dunn 2004) . While English-speaking countries have a tradition of policy analysis, it has been institutionalized only recently in CEE. Policy analysis as a practically oriented discipline strives to provide clients (typically public offi cials with a decision-making authority) with such information and evidence that they can use in designing specifi c policies. Policy analysis typically includes problem defi nition, identifi cation of alternative solutions, evaluation of such options and recommendations on what (not) to do. Traditional policy analysis is based on the assumption that what politicians (or other authorized offi cials) need for making a decision is a piece of frank and faithful advice derived from systematic analysis and based on the best available evidence. Th e main idea of traditional analysis can be expressed by the motto, "speaking truth to power", in which truth stands for maximum objectiveness. In the Czech context, as in any other CEE country, policy analysis is barely established as a discipline, and the term is rarely applied in practice. Nevertheless, we assume that the actual work of MOs and ROs in the Czech Republic also covers those tasks that are normally undertaken by policy analysts (gathering data and relevant information, defi ning problems, identifying alternative solutions, selecting options and formulating recommendations).
Th e other type of tasks on which we focus in this paper concerns communication and negotiation with other actors. As many authors have noted, merely "speaking truth" oft en does not result in better policy choices.
5 Th e policy process is typically not so much about "fi nding the truth" but rather about fi nding a consensus, or reconciling diff erent interests, values and beliefs. In the words of Robert Hoppe (1999) , "speaking truth to power" is less important than "making sense together" -striving to identify shared meanings and mutual recognition. In this respect, many authors argue that it is increasingly important to communicate with other actors in public administration and beyond, while tasks such as data analysis or cost-and-benefi t evaluation of policy options are receiving less attention (Colebatch and Radin 2006).
In other words, it can be argued that the amount of work in the domain of traditional policy analysis (data collection and analysis, assessment of options) is negatively correlated to the intensity of communication and negotiation. Th e fewer analytical tasks a given institution undertakes, the more it communicates with other actors, and vice versa. In the absence of relevant longitudinal data, we can attempt to test this idea by comparing the tasks undertaken in diff erent types of institutions or geographical locations. Interestingly in this respect, Rasmussen et al. (unpublished) compared the work of regional bureaucracies in the small Canadian province of Saskatchewan with two of Canada's largest provinces. In small jurisdictions like Saskatchewan, few institutions specialize on policy analysis. Based on their fi ndings, the authors have concluded that public offi cials in such small jurisdictions obtain the necessary information through more active involvement in various networks.
Several theoretical arguments have been formulated to support the hypothesis that analytical tasks are at odds with brokering and networking. Th e fi rst possible reason for this lies in the assumed decline of public administration's expert capacities due to outsourcing. Policy analytical capacities were traditionally concentrated within the confi nes of public administration, but in the course of the 1990s, the ideology of New Public Management infl uenced many developed countries to change their methods of producing the underlying analysis for policy decisions. Public administration has been under considerable political pressure to cut down on internal expertise and outsource a growing portion of its analytical tasks (Craft and Howlett 2013; Veselý 2012 Veselý , 2013b . It can be argued that as public-administration bodies produced less analysis on their own, they had to reorient themselves on the process of public procurement and communication with bidders. Th at is, instead of production of internal analysis, offi cials are assumed to be more involved in communication with those outside the administration who actually produce it.
Another line of argument supporting the division between analysis and communication concerns general changes in governance. Th e political systems of developed countries have been undergoing profound changes in many respects. A lot of decision-making has been transferred from the central level to the regional and local levels, a trend referred to as "multilevel governance" (Hooghe and Marks 2003) . Policy processes have been colonized by a multitude of new actors (Colebatch 2006) and increasingly shaped by networks of actors, rather than traditional hierarchies (Rhodes 1996) . Many authors have argued that in a "network society" central governments are increasingly unable to assert their policies through "hierarchical relations". With the broadening array of actors involved in the policy process, it is no longer possible for any single organization (including central government and its ministries) to pursue its mission on its own, separately from others (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) . Over the past two decades, public administration underwent considerable decentralization, with decision-making powers transferred to lower levels of government. Th is was accompanied by a growing role of supra-national institutions, especially the European Union. With the fragmentation of policy-analytical capacities grew the need to create links and share information between the diff erent levels of governance.
How are these theoretical assumptions refl ected in the everyday work of public offi cials ? What is the proportion of "analysts" and "brokers" in public administration ? Are policy-analysis tasks really at odds with negotiation and networking ? According to the above theories, we should assume the existence of a large group of offi cials whose job it is solely to communicate and negotiate with citizens and other institutions of the public, civic and private sectors. Since working hours are always limited and attention can only be split between a fi nite number of priorities, one would hypothesize a negative correlation between these two types of work, with individual offi cials typically involved either in analysis or in brokering. In the absence of longitudinal data, we cannot verify changes in the proportion of analytical and brokering tasks over time. However, by comparing the offi cials working in central and regional administration, we can test the hypothesized relationship between organizational size and the extent of analytical tasks, assuming that ROs are involved less in analysis but more in communication / brokering, while MOs do more analysis and less communication / brokering.
Counterarguments against the hypothesis that there is a negative correlation between analytical and brokering tasks might be, however, also formulated. Both types of work require the same set of skills and need not be mutually exclusive. Th us, the tasks of policy analysis and brokering may be confl icting in some cases (negative correlation) and complementary in other cases (positive correlation). Th is may vary from organization to organization, depending on its size and age. Smaller and historically younger bodies of regional government can be expected to exhibit a more complementary relationship between the two types of work. Conversely, in the context of the larger and older ministries with more heterogeneous responsibilities, offi cials should have more opportunities and fi nd it more essential to specialize and choose between the diff erent types of work. In other words, we expect a closer coexistence between policy analysis and brokering tasks in the work of ROs.
Methodology and data
In this paper we use data from two recently realized large-N empirical surveys. One survey targeted ROs and the other one MOs. Th e target group was defi ned as all employees of a given ministry or regional offi ce except those involved exclusively in its internal operations (car fl eet, maintenance, secretariat, accounting etc.). In both surveys, research design and the questionnaire were strongly inspired by the recent Canadian studies. Our questionnaire was based on the original research instrument of Adam Wellstead, Michael Howlett and their colleagues. Th e MO and RO questionnaires were basically identical, with a few new questions added for the MO survey.
As for the RO survey, data collection by means of CAWI (Computer-Aided Web Interviews) took place between September and November 2012. Prior to that, we compiled contact information from the offi cial websites of the diff erent Regional Offi ces and created a complete list of the ROs targeted (sample frame, 2615 contacts). All ROs in the sample frame were sent an email invitation to participate in the survey, which consisted of a link to the online instrument and a motivation letter from the organizers. 200 email contacts bounced and were identifi ed as invalid. A total of 783 questionnaires were completed in full, resulting in a total response rate of 32.4 %.
Data collection in the MO survey was organized between April and July 2013. Staff directories with contact information were found online for only 2 out of 14 ministries; the rest of them treated such directories as confi dential.
Step by step, 11 ministries agreed to participate in the survey (and disclose their staff directories, which served us as our sample frame). In seven ministries, data was collected by face-to-face interviewing: interviewers met with respondents, asked them a series of predefi ned standard questions and recorded their answers on a paper form (CAPI) or in a computer application (PAPI). For two ministries which preferred to participate without the involvement of interviewers, data was collected by the administration of online questionnaires (CAWI). In one ministry, a combination of CAPI and CAWI was implemented. Th e respondents were selected randomly from each ministerial sample frame. However, aft er a number of waves of random sampling, all individuals from each sample frame were eventually invited to participate. Th us, what was intended to be random sampling turned out as a census. A total of 1351 complete questionnaires were obtained, and the response rate was 29.4 %.
Both surveys were faced with methodological challenges. Especially the MO survey underwent several refi nements to its research design due to the diff erent ministries' specifi c demands (e.g. CAWI) or limitations (e.g. job positions not identifi ed in staff directory). For these reasons, we made an extraordinary eff ort to keep our methodology as rigorous and transparent as possible. Detailed methodological information about this survey can be found in a special article (Veselý 2013a) , which also discusses in more detail the methodological challenges of implementation and of the possible limitations of the data obtained. Th e relatively low response rate (compared to "classical" opinion surveys) has been identifi ed as the central issue. Nevertheless, response-rate issues are normal for this type of studies, and our response rate was equal to or higher than that the levels reached in similar surveys among government offi cials abroad.
6 Th e analysis did not reveal any systematic bias, and we did not identify any reasons to believe that the data should be aff ected by it. Although the results of the analysis should be interpreted with caution (especially with regard to smaller units), the sample size and the sampling procedure guarantee both unique and suffi ciently robust data to allow unprecedented insight in the everyday realities of work in Czech government administration at the central and regional levels. Table 1 . Although most of the diff erences are statistically signifi cant, they vary in magnitude from variable to variable. What stands out at fi rst sight (and more or less meets our expectations) is the diff erence in gender ratio: equal numbers of men and women work in Czech ministries, while the majority of ROs are women (61.7 %).
As for age, MOs are on average two years older than ROs, which is in accordance with our hypothesis. While offi cials around thirty represent the strongest age group at both levels of government, there are diff erences in other aspects of the age structure. Th e age distribution of the ROs is more even, with fewer demographic "indentations". Additional diff erences become apparent when three age groups are defi ned (younger than 35, 35 -49 and 50+). Th e youngest group is represented equally in both levels of (32 % of MOs and 33 % of ROs are younger than 35), and the middle-age group accounts for 32 % of MOs and 39 % of ROs. Th e main diff erence is in the oldest category: persons aged 50+ comprise only 28 % of ROs but as many as 37 % of MOs. In other words, the age structure of ministerial staff is weaker in the middle generation, while middle-aged offi cials form the "spine" of regional administration. In ministries, there is a large group of offi cials in pre-retirement or retirement age.
Th e data on education is also in line with our expectations: the overall education level of MOs is somewhat higher than that of ROs. Both groups are generally well-educated, with more than 90 % of MOs and more than 88 % of ROs having at least a Bachelor's degree. Th e Master's degree is clearly predominant (71 % of MOs, 6 The response rate in the survey of MOs in seven new member states of the EU, which was implemented by RAND and OECD, ranged typically between 20 % and 25 %; Slovakia was the only country to exceed 25 %, while Hungary reached as little as 10 % (Meyer-Sahling 2009, 89).
7 It should also be noted that in this paper we analyze the whole sample and do not discriminate between levels of offi cials (e.g. senior, mid-level, lower level). We are aware that the position in public-administration hierarchy can have a signifi cant impact on profi le and tasks (e.g. Kabele and Hájek 2008; Howlett 2011) . Thus it will be useful in the future to run separate analyses for different levels of public offi cials.
% of ROs).
Persons with a Bachelor's degree account for 12 % of ROs, compared to 7 % of MOs; conversely, there are more workers with doctorates in the ministries (13 %) than in the regions (6 %). Both these numbers are quite high, given the total number of PhDs in the Czech workforce. Undoubtedly, the generally high levels of education among MOs and ROs are caused by the fact that a university degree is a typical job requirement; it remains diffi cult to interpret the high proportion of offi cials with a PhD degree.
Th e survey also included a question about the number of years spent in civil service. As the MOs are generally older, it is not surprising that they also have worked as civil servants for more years. Nevertheless, MOs and ROs have the same mean number of years spent in the present ministry or regional offi ce. Further analysis revealed a higher variance of this parameter among MOs, with bigger groups of those who have been in the ministry for less than 6 years (50 %, compared to 45 % of ROs) or more than 10 years (31 %, compared to 23 % of ROs). Th is suggests the existence of at least two typical categories of ministerial workers in terms of their history in the present institution: "veterans" and a large group of relative "freshmen". Th e middle group of offi cials who have worked in the ministry for 6 -10 years is relatively small, compared to the regional level.
Th e above fi ndings allow us to draw one tentative conclusion: with the exception of "veterans", the jobs of ministerial offi cials are more precarious, i.e. affected by higher levels of fl uctuation, than jobs in the regional offi ces. Th is interpretation is further supported by data about individual plans to stay with the present employer. On average, MOs are planning to stay fewer years, with as many as 7 % planning to leave in less than a year (compared to just 2 % of ROs), and only 22 % of MOs maintain a long-term perspective of more than 10 years (compared to 39 % of ROs). Further analysis by age groups reveals that this discrepancy is not primarily caused by the higher mean age of MOs. In contrast, the absence of a job perspective with the present employer aff ects young MOs (under 30) more than young ROs. Th is may be caused by several reasons. First, due to the absence of the eff ective Civil Service Act or other obstacles, young people may fi nd little perspective in their ministerial jobs. Also, because all ministries are located in Prague with its rather abundant job opportunities, a large group of young MOs may consider public service merely as a start-up job bridging the time between university and a more desirable stage of their professional career. In contrast, since there are fewer opportunities for highly qualifi ed workers while in the regional capitals, a regional offi ce job may represent one of the few stable career perspectives for people with a university degree (or even a PhD).
Another question concerned the offi cials' prior career histories. As hypothesized, MOs are somewhat more likely than ROs to have an academic job on their resume. Not surprisingly, MOs are more likely to have prior job experience from central government administration and ROs from district offi ces or other bodies of regional administration. Th e two levels of government have equal percentages of offi cials without prior job experience (who came straight from university) or with experience from the NGO sector. Surprisingly, relatively many MOs have job experience from the business sector (43 %, compared to 25 % of ROs). Th is fi nding is diffi cult to interpret and contradicts the common stereotype of "career bureaucrats" who join the ranks of civil service immediately aft er university and remain completely untouched by business experience. In the future, it would surely be interesting to examine MOs' motivations for this kind of career change (perhaps higher pay, higher job security, shorter hours, higher self-effi cacy in terms of public interest etc.).
Tasks undertaken
Th e other group of research questions concerns the tasks MOs and ROs actually undertake in their jobs. Two items of the questionnaires are relevant for this purpose. First, the respondents were presented with a list of tasks and asked whether or not they were personally involved in each of them (Table 2a) . Th is was a dichotomous (yes / no), multiple-choice question (respondents were free to tick as many options as they wanted). Inspired by the Canadian surveys, the second item consisted of a battery measuring the frequency of involvement in each type of tasks (Table 2b) . Th e wording of questions was identical for MOs and ROs, with only a few minor exceptions. 8 Apart from these exceptions, all items are directly and fully comparable.
As Tables 2a and 2b show, only few tasks are undertaken to the same extent by both MOs and ROs (these include budgeting and communication with other bodies of the public sector or with NGOs, and partly also the preparation of conceptual / strategic policy documents). All other types of tasks display clear diff erences between the two groups of offi cials. MOs are more likely to undertake data collection, research, problem identifi cation and identifi cation of possible solutions. Th us, as expected, MOs are more involved in analytical tasks and research than ROs. However, in absolute terms, MOs do not display high levels of "research capacities". As many as 65 % of MOs (and the same percentage of ROs) stated they were never involved in research tasks, while only 5 % of MOs dealt with them daily or several times a week. Somewhat surprisingly, ROs also display a higher prevalence of routine administrative acts.
In contrast, ROs are more likely to implement policies or programs, direct and monitor programs or lower-level bodies, provide advice for political bodies of the 8 The question on "preparing conceptual and strategic policy documents of …" referred to "the Ministry" for MOs and "the Region" for ROs. The question referring to "organizations directly controlled" by the ministry was administered to MOs only. Finally, the question about consultations / negotiations with politicians was administered to MOs as two separate questions, one referring to politicians working in the same offi ce (e.g. the Minister or Deputy Ministers) and the other one to those working elsewhere; this distinction was irrelevant to regional offi ces because they are headed by career bureaucrats, not elected politicians.
Table 1
A profi le of ministerial and regional offi cials Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, Independent t-Test (2 tailed) Labels: 0 = no, 1 = yes.
Table 2b
Tasks undertaken (ordinal variable) Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, Independent t-Test (2 tailed) Labels: 1 = never, 2 = several times a year, 3 = several times a quarter, 4 = several times a month, 5 = several times a week, 6 = daily.
region, negotiate with elected politicians, communicate with citizens and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, provide methodological guidance, train or lecture. Equally surprising is the lower average intensity of routine administrative acts among ROs.
Analysts or brokers ?
Th e last research concerned the extent to which policy-analytical tasks are complementary to or mutually exclusive with tasks such as negotiation or communication.
In order to test that hypothesis, we have reduced the tasks undertaken by MOs and ROs to two internally consistent composite variables. Based upon results of factor analysis and the theoretical background explained above, we have created two composite variables. Th e fi rst variable, labelled "analytical tasks" includes: collection of data and information, problem identifi cation, identifi cation of possible solutions and evaluation of possible solutions. Th e second variable, referred to as "brokering tasks", includes: consultations or negotiations with bodies of central state administration, with bodies of regional administration, with elected politicians or with other stakeholders and consultations with the public. Th e value of each composite variable was defi ned as the sum of the frequencies of the diff erent tasks included where 1 equals never and 6 equals daily. While the level of internal consistency is satisfactory for both composite variables, it is higher for analytical tasks than for brokering tasks. Table 4 below gives more information on the intensity of analytical and brokering tasks in the two samples generally, and for each ministry specifi cally. It is immediately apparent that both MOs and ROs tend to undertake analytical tasks much more frequently than brokering tasks. As expected, MOs are more likely to undertake analytical tasks. As the intensity of brokering tasks is approximately the same in both samples, we have rejected the hypothesis that organizations with lower involvement in analytical tasks are more preoccupied with communication and negotiation. As for the distribution of analytical and brokering tasks between ministries, the highest intensity of analytical tasks is exhibited by the Ministries of Foreign Aff airs, Defense and Transportation, and the lowest levels by Labor and Social Aff airs, Justice, and Education, Youth and Sports. It should be noted that these results do not suggest that some ministries are "better" than others because they tell us nothing about the complexity and quality of their policy-analytical eff orts. However, possible structural diff erences between the ministries cannot be ruled out, and it would certainly be interesting to examine more thoroughly why MOs in "social" ministries (that are responsible for public services such as health care, education or social welfare) exhibit the lowest intensity of analytical tasks and, at the same time, slightly above-average involvement in brokering tasks. Table 5 indicates individual-level correlations between analytical tasks and brokering tasks. Th ere is clearly a strong positive association between these two types of tasks: offi cials involved in analytical tasks are also more likely to undertake brokering tasks. It is in sharp contrast with the hypothesis that analytical and brokering activities are at odds. Quite the opposite is the case -these types of tasks are highly complementary both among MOs and even more so among ROs. A comparison between ministries reveals high diff erences in the strength of the relation-ship between analytical and brokering tasks, with the highest levels of correlation measured for the Ministries of Foreign Aff airs, Transportation, Environment, and Industry and Trade. Th is suggests that "social" ministries might exhibit higher levels of specialization between analytical and brokering tasks than the other ministries. It also indicates the oft en overlooked fact that the nature of policy work diff ers between policy domains, e.g. between the so-called "power" and "social" ministries. Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01
Discussion and conclusions
Scholarly articles are oft en concluded with a call that "more research is needed", and we could certainly make use of that cliché as well. In this paper, we have opened a topic which is marked by large gaps in empirical evidence. We have been able to fi ll some of these gaps with results from two original surveys. Some of our fi ndings confi rm our hypotheses based upon theoretical background and fi ndings from other jurisdictions. However, at the same time, other fi ndings lead to new questions and challenge current theoretical assumptions. At the moment, for instance, we are not able to fully explain the high level of MOs' previous experience in the business sector or why ROs display such a high level of providing methodological guidance, training or lecturing. Other fi ndings, such as the assumed lower stability of work in ministries, can be reasonably explained by factors such as an ineff ective Civil Service Code. Th is, too, however, should be confi rmed by further research.
Our analysis of work tasks has been led by the hypothesis that in current public-administration negotiation, communication and networking become more and more prevalent, and that this can be at odds with analytical tasks. Our data strongly rejects this hypothesis. Most offi cials are multitaskers. It is not by accident that several respondents used the open question asking them to describe their work activities commenting that they felt like "Ferdy the Ant -work of all kinds". Ferdy the Ant is a hero from famous books by Czech writer Ondřej Sekora. Ferdy is an extraordinary ant with a lot of diverse experience and challenges, which he is able to solve with manifold abilities and skills. In the Czech discourse, Ferdy the Ant is a synonym for a person who has to -and is able to -do many quite diverse things.
Th e "Ferdy phenomenon", as we could call it, seem to be especially visible in regional offi ces. It might be caused by the fact that regional offi ces are on average smaller than ministries, and there is thus a lower capacity to specialize on particular tasks such as analysis. It is also true that in ministries with a higher number of employees (such as the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Finance) the correlation between analytical and brokering tasks is lower than in smaller ministries such as the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Transportation). However, there is no clear linear trend. For instance, the Ministry of Health, where the correlation is the lowest, is a relatively small ministry.
In any event, analytical and brokering tasks seem to be rather complementary, although we are not sure why. We can hypothesize that the line between diff erent groups of offi cials is drawn along the intensity of their work, rather than its content. Th e actual tasks undertaken by any given MO or RO may somewhat deviate from their offi cial job description. Like any other institution, public administration is occupied both by people who live for their work, strive to be active and effi cient and work extra hours when necessary 9 , and by others who work to earn their living and do not seek any special engagement. Based on our data, we would also assume that in order to do the job of policy analysis thoroughly, one needs to spend some extra time consulting and negotiating. In other words, those who honestly strive to identify problems and recommend solutions fi nd it necessary to consult their opinions with those stakeholders who are most aff ected by these problems.
Finally, the fi ndings of our analysis also feed back into the theoretical framework. Th e nature of the work in public administration seems to depend on a number of additional factors that tend to be overlooked. Besides macro-structural factors such as decentralization, multilevel governance and the growing role of networking, we have identifi ed a number of mezzo-and micro-factors such as: size of the bureau, age of the institution, policy domain (health, social aff airs etc.) or employment opportunities in the region. Th ere is also a specifi cally Czech factor, the precarious employment situation of MOs given by the ineff ective Public Service Act. Th e fact that our data was collected in 2013, i.e. before the Act came into eff ect, gives us the opportunity to make a comparison in the future to see the diff erence such a regulatory framework would make.
